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Abstract Gender equality, a policy objective of basically universal acceptance, has
become a subject of interest in national governments, international organizations,
research instructions, and political pressure groups. This paper reports recent inves-
tigations regarding gender disparities in the labor market. The main aim of our study
is to identify factors affecting gender earning disparities in the European Union
member states. Empirical research is provided in two separate areas. The first one
focuses on the gender pay gap in the EU based on SES 2006 data. The second one is a
detailed analysis of factors influencing wages in Poland, employing LFS 2009 data.
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Introduction
Disparity can be identified as the condition or fact of being unequal in various
situations (not having access to certain goods or services, e.g., education) or places
(home, work, etc.). Labor market discrimination exists when two equally qualified
individuals are treated differently solely on the basis of their individual characteris-
tics. Inequalities in the labor market can occur in many different ways, such as by
gender, sexual orientation, age, race, disabilities, religion, language, etc. (Cain 1986,
p. 693) Disparity can be multidimensional and linked to inequality in skills, educa-
tion, opportunities, happiness, health, life expectancy, welfare, assets, and social
mobility. It is mostly measured by wage differentials, but the non-income dimension
is also considered (see Heshmati (2004) as an example).
Labor market discrimination by gender, race, and ethnicity is a world-wide
problem and, as Neuman and Oaxaca (2003) have claimed, estimation of various
types of discrimination has become routine since the wage decomposition method-
ology was popularized by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Therefore, there is a
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large amount of research concerning different types of inequalities reported in the
literature. For instance, problems of racism are discussed by Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004), age discrimination by Neumark and Stock (1999), and
disablism (disability discrimination) by Baldwin and Johnson (1994), among others.
Eurobarometer research has pointed out two negative phenomena: violence against
women and wage inequality between women and men. Gender equality is a policy
objective of basically universal acceptance and is a subject of interest in many
national governments, international organizations, research institutes, and political
pressure groups. The strategy for equality between women and men (2010–2015) was
adopted by the European Commission on 21 September 2010. Also, the United
Nations Millennium Declaration promulgates the pursuit of gender equality as one
of the eight Millennium Development Goals to be reached by 2015. Problems
regarding women’s participation in the labor market became one of the main issues
under current discussion because of the financial–economic crisis and aging of
societies in developed countries.
In our research, we focus on gender wage disparities in the labor markets of European
Union member countries. The paper consists of five sections based on literature reviews
and my own empirical research. The first section provides a general overview on gender
discrimination. Next, different measures of inequalities are presented. The section
following that is dedicated to the description of the labor market in centrally-planned
economies and the impact on the current situation in transitional countries. A literature
review regarding gender inequality is presented in the fourth section. The last section
contains some results of empirical investigations. The main aim of our analysis1 is to
answer the question: What affects gender disparities in earnings? The analysis initially
focuses on the European labor market as a whole. Gender pay gap (GPG) data estimated
by Eurostat on the basis of metadata from the Structure of Earning Survey (SES) are
provided. The paper is also concerned with the labor market in Poland that represents the
largest (in terms of population, territory, and GDP) transition economy country among
new European Union member states. Research is provided applying micro data from the
Labor Force Survey (LFS).
Gender Discrimination
There are several indicators, such as income, employment, and social benefits, that may
be examined in order to assess the relative economic situation of women. However,
wages seem to be the most important determinant of economic well-being and personal
success. In particular, themale–female earnings differential affects the position of women
in the labor market as well as the status and power of women within the household.
Despite limited academic attention (Adamchik and Bedi 2003), the popular press and
non-governmental organizations have often highlighted the importance of analyzing
gender pay differences in the labor market. An assessment of this sort is important, as
relatively lower wage rates for women may generate a wide spectrum of negative
consequences. First, lower wage rates for womenmay increase the economic dependence
1 Research is conducted on wage inequalities between men and women in Poland in the framework of the
European Union, financed by National Science Centre grant No. 2011/01/B/HS4/06346, Poland.
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of women on their male partners, which in turn may increase their susceptibility to
domestic violence. Second, many women are single mothers and are the sole wage
earners in their families. For single mothers, adverse labor market outcomes combined
with less accessible child care are likely to enhance the probability that their families live
in poverty. Third, gender differences at the work place are transformed into inequality
after retirement. Since, on average, women live longer than men, they are more likely to
fall into poverty in their old age.
A growing area of research attempts to collect direct evidence on gender discrimi-
nation in the labor market in two main ways. First, some studies have examined whether
female workers earn less than comparable male workers within the same establishments
and narrowly defined occupational categories. Second, a number of studies attempt to
measure productivity for female and male workers directly to determine whether gender
pay differences can be directly linked to productivity differences. Research presented by
Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) and Young andWallace (2009) are two good examples.
Gender discrimination may take a variety of forms (McConnell and Brue 1986, p.
290; Kot 1999, p. 225–226):
1. wage discrimination when men and women who work side by side doing the
same tasks equally well obtain different payment;
2. discrimination in hiring when the unemployment rate of women is significantly
higher than that of men, i.e., women are the first to be fired and the last to be hired;
3. occupational segregation defined as the division of labour, as a result of which men
and women are channelled into different types of occupational roles and tasks, such
that there are two separate labour forces (Marshall 1998);
4. educational gender segregation (human capital discrimination) when different forms of
training and education are not equally available to both genders, thereby reducing
human capital (McConnell and Brue 1986, p. 289, see also Livanos and Pouliakas
2009).
The first three types of gender discrimination influence labor disparities directly
when one is seeking a job, thus they are called direct or market discrimination.
Human capital discrimination appears prior to entering the job market, therefore it
is called indirect discrimination.
Historically, gender differences in work values, perceived as a rationalization for
occupational gender segregation, have been de-emphasized in the sociological liter-
ature. More recent experimental studies in behavioral economics have noted essential
differences between men and women in individual attitudes towards altruism and
greed, leadership and competitiveness (Fortin 2005). It is also well known that
women tend to be occupationally segregated from men and are penalized because
of such segregation. Occupational segregation is mostly caused by stereotypical,
biological, and social differences between genders (and races). Occupational segre-
gation2 is also derived from what is known as “gender essentialism”, the belief that
because of biological differences between men and women, they are different as far as
character and personality are concerned. Gender essentialists view men as being
2 Segregation arises when preconceived notions about a particular gender are carried over into the
workforce, and a person’s competency is based on these prejudices (i.e. thinking all women are weak
and cannot engage in heavy labor).
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strong and powerful and women as being weak and emotional. The concentration of
women in certain sectors of the economy is also called horizontal segregation.3
Vertical segregation is the concentration or over-representation of women in certain
levels of the professional hierarchy.4
It is extremely difficult to explain causes and mechanisms of gender discrimination,
however it is easier to define it than to measure such inequalities (Kot 1999, p. 225). The
literature offers a variety of theories about how and why women face discrimination in
the labor market: Becker (1957), Madden (1975), McConnell and Brue (1986), Thurow
(1975), Arrow (1973), and Bergmann (1971), among others.
Measurements of Inequalities
Another important issue is the measurement of gender disparities in terms of the types
of discrimination presented above. There are several gender-related indicators and
gender inequality indexes. The former are represented by either the Gender-Related
Development Index or the Gender Empowerment Measure introduced by the (UN)
United Nations Development Programme in 1995 and their modifications, and the
latter are represented by the Relative Status of Women index (Dijkstra and Hanmer
2000) and Gender Equality Index, (GDI) introduced by Social Watch in 2005 for all
UN states and the one overworked by the European Institute for Gender Equality
(EIGE) in 2013, or Standardized Index of Gender Equality (Dijkstra 2002). These
gender inequality indicators broadly encompass different socioeconomic aspects
discussed by Klasen and Schuler (2011). However, at the labor market level, the
aspects generally associated with explaining the differences are (Ñopo et al. 2011):
1. personal and job characteristics of women (age, education, experience, occupa-
tion, working time, job status, type of contract),
2. labor market structure (occupational segregation by gender, level of formality), and
3. institutional, cultural, and social norms and traditions.
Some of the above mentioned aspects are not directly observable or measurable,
therefore one of the main challenges is to measure this discrepancy in the labor
market. Popular measurements of inequality are based on comparisons of male and
female indicators regarding rates of unemployment, structure of employment in terms
of management positions, and payments.5 The latter is measured in several ways, for
instance Becker (1957) introduced the discrimination coefficient d:
d ¼ WM
WF





3 With horizontal segregation, occupational gender segregation occurs as men and women are thought to
possess different physical, emotional, and mental capabilities. These different capabilities suggest the
genders vary in the types of jobs they are suited for. This can be specifically viewed with the gendered
division between manual and non-manual labor.
4 With vertical segregation, occupational gender segregation occurs as occupations are stratified according
to the power, authority, income, and prestige associated with the occupation and women (or men) are
excluded from holding such jobs.
5 We just mention some examples.
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where: WM and WF represent real earnings of male and female paid employees,
respectively.
In other words, the female to male wage ratio is: WFWM ¼ 11þd . If the discrimination
coefficient d equals 0.5, it means that (due to the Becker theory) the employer will hire
women if men earn 50 % more than women, i.e., the wage ratio: WMWF ¼ 32 .


























where: WM0 and WF0 represent the hypothetical earnings of male and female paid
employees when there is no gender discrimination, respectively. WM and WF represent
real earnings, as previously.
If D=0, there is a lack of discrimination. For D>0, women earn less than men. The
situation is the opposite for D<0, however, this situation is rarely observed.6 Here the
question arises how to evaluate the hypothetical earnings of male and female em-
ployees when there is no gender discrimination. Neumark (1988), Cotton (1988),
Oaxaca (1973), as well as Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) have suggested some more or
less arbitrary solutions. Kot (1999) evaluated WM0 and WF0 directly on the basis of a
survey by asking employee respondents about the:
& minimum wages they are ready to accept in their current positions, with that value
treated as their productivity self evaluation, and
& maximum wages which they can offer for a certain position regardless of the gender
of the employee.
Similar to the payment discrimination coefficient is the so-called gender pay gap
(GPG), evaluated by Eurostat using data from the Structure of Earnings Survey. GPG is
defined as follows:





where for each i-th country or region,GHWMi is the average gross hourly earnings of male
paid employees andGHWFi is the average gross hourly earnings of female paid employees.
The GPG represents the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male
and female employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of male paid
employees. From reference year 2006 onwards, the new GPG data is based on the
methodology of the Structure of Earnings Survey carried out once every four years.
The most recently available reference years are 2002 and 2006, and Eurostat com-
puted the GPG for these years on this basis.7 For the intermediate years (2007
onwards), countries provide Eurostat with estimates benchmarked on the SES results.
6 We reported such cases in: Fernández-Avilés et al. (2010), as well as in Matuszewska-Janica and
Witkowska (2010).
7 SES results from 2010 has been not available yet.
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Table 1 contains a comparison of GPG evaluated for 27 EU member states for 2006
and 2011. It is obvious that the average for Europe decreased from 18.4 in 2006 to
16.2 % in 2011. However, in some countries, the gender pay gap increased in 2011 in
comparison to 2006 (i.e., in Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Bulgaria, Hungary, Malta,
and Romania). In 2011, the smallest wage disparities were observed in Slovenia (2.3%),
Poland (4.5 %), and Italy (5.8 %) while the biggest were in Estonia (27.3 %), Austria
(23.7 %), Germany (22.2 %), and Greece (22 %).
Other important issues include the economic activity of Society and the structure of
employment. Measures that are used most often to describe the labor market are activity
(participation) and employment rates. According to the Eurostat definition, the econom-
ically active population (labor force) encompasses all persons aged 15–64 whether
employed or unemployed. Therefore, activity is defined as the share of the number of
active persons in the whole population in the same age group, i.e.:
RAil ¼ NAilNW il ⋅100 ð4Þ
where: NAil and NWil represent counts of economically active persons and the whole
population belonging to the l-th age group in the i-th country, respectively.
Table 1 Employment rate (6) and gender pay gap (3) for women evaluated in the years 2006 and 2011
Region or country RWi GPGi Country RWi GPGi
2006 2006 2011 2006 2006 2011
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
European Union EU27 8.07 18.4 16.2p Bulgaria BG 2.0 12.4 13.0
Austria AT 21.13 25.5 23.7e Czech Republic CZ 13.30 23.4 21.0
Belgium BE 17.58 9.5 10.2 Cyprus CY 5.18 21.8 16.4p
Denmark DK −2.54 17.6 16.4 Estonia EE −18.33 30.3 27.3
Finland FI −4.64 21.2 18.2p Hungary HU 0.64 14.4 18.0
France FR 10.44 15.4 14.7p Latvia LV −10.97 15.1 13.6
Germany* DE 12.22 22.7 22.2p Lithuania LT −4.89 17.1 11.9
Greece GR 14.80 20.7 22.0a Malta MT 26.43 5.2 12.9
Italy IT 15.24 4.4c 5.8 Poland PL 5.66 7.4 4.5
Ireland IE −1.75 17.2 13.9b Romania RO 7.57 7.8 12.1
Luxembourg LU 28.87 10.7 8.7p Slovenia SI 7.00 8.0 2.3
Netherlands NL 7.04 23.6 17.9 Slovakia SK 3.54 25.8 20.5
Portugal PT 3.07 8.4 12.5
Spain ES 18.57 17.9 16.2p
Sweden SE −2.58 16.5 15.8
United Kingdom UK −0.23 24.3 20.1
Columns 2 7 3 Matuszewska-Janica and Witkowska (2010), columns 4 Eurostat
*Germany (until 1990 former FRG), p: provisional data, e: estimated data, a, b: data from 2008 to 2010
respectively
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The employment rate is calculated by Eurostat by dividing the number of
employed persons aged 20 to 64 by the total population of the same age group:
REil ¼ NEilNW il ⋅100 ð5Þ
where NEil and NWil represent counts of employed persons and the whole population
belonging to the l-th age group in the i-th country, respectively. Both measures may be
calculated for the whole population and for men and women separately, as well as for
different age groups, etc.
Figures 1 and 2 show the overall employment rate for the EU and the female
employment rate (5). An economic crisis is clearly visible in 2008–2010 when the
employment rate decreased, although it had an increasing tendency from the begin-
ning of the millennium. Beginning in 2010, we have noticed a stabilization tendency
in the labor market in Europe. Women’s participation in the labor market systemat-
ically increased. The difference between employment rates for the European popula-
tion in total and for women decreased from 7.6 % in 2003 to 5.6 % in 2012 (Fig. 1).
The average female employment rate in 27 EU member states was 58.6 % in year
2012 (i.e., nearly 59 % of women aged 20–64 were employed.) The highest female
employment rate (70 %) was observed in Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands
while the lowest (below 50 %) was observed in Southern Europe (i.e., Greece, Malta,
and Italy) (Fig. 2).8
It is also possible to measure women’s participation in the labor market, defined as
the female employment rate, using a measure that describes the structure of employ-
ment by comparing the differential between male and female employment, with the
following formula:




where: NMi, NFi, and NWi are counts of employed men and women and the whole
population in the i-th state, respectively.
Since NM + NF is total employment, the female employment rate is the percentage
excess of male employees in the labor market when RW>0, and describes the opposite
situation when RW<0. If RW=0 the number of men and women in the labor market is
the same.
In international and temporal comparisons, the measures presented above are
additionally described by subscripts (or superscripts) for j-th economic sector, k-th
job seniority group, the l-th age group, the t-th period of time, etc.9 For example:
RWit ¼ NMit−N FitNMit þ N Fit ⋅100 ð7Þ
8 The distributions of overall employment rates for men and women combined for 2012 are similar. See
also Teichgraber (2012) for a similar analysis based on data from the European Union Labour Force Survey
for 2011.
9 Depending upon the type of analysis, one might consider for inclusion economic branches, age, working
time, job status, type of contract, etc.
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describes the structure of employment in the i-th country or region and the t-th period
of time, since NMit and NFit are counts of men and women employed in the i-th
country or region and the t-th period of time, respectively.
The female employment rate (6) evaluated for 27 EU states in 2006 is presented in




















Fig. 1 Changes in the employment rate (for individuals ages 20–64) in the European Union (27 member
states) for 2003–2012. Source: Eurostat





























Average female employment rates in 2012 for women ages 20-64
Fig. 2 Female employment rate (for women ages 20–64) in 2012. Source: Eurostat. Note: Germany* until
1990 former FRG
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employees. In Scandinavian countries, the UK, and Lithuania, the excess of female
employees is smaller than 5 %, while in Estonia and Latvia, the measure (6) equals
18 % and 11 % respectively. The biggest excess of male employees is observed in
Luxemburg (29 %), Malta (26 %) and Austria (21 %) while for the whole European
Union it is 8 %.
Another measure describing the structure of employment is the feminization rate:




which represents the share of women working in the j-th economic branch in the i-th
country. Analysis of that rate depicts whether sectorial segregation exists.
The analysis of wage differences between men and women has recently emerged
as one of the core questions in labor market research, mainly due to increasing
participation of women in the labor market (see Figs. 1 and 2). In fact, according to
the 2008 European Commission Report on equality between women and men,
quantitative progress has been made in connection with the European strategy for
growth and jobs. However, efforts are still needed to boost the qualitative aspect of
equality. Moreover, the objective of eliminating gender gaps in employment must be
continued and intensified by tackling labor market segregation.
Labor Market Under Communism and its Impact on the Current Situation
in Transitional Economies
Central and Eastern European states have experienced an essential change in their
political and economic structures since 1989, when radical reforms started in Poland
that were followed by other countries belonging to the former Soviet bloc (Keane and
Prasad 2006). The privatization of state owned enterprises and implementation of
market mechanisms were the main goals of reform introduced in post-communist
countries. The transition also involved significant changes in labor market institu-
tions. Constraints on layoffs and redundancies were significantly reduced and unem-
ployment appeared. There has also been a massive inter-sectoral labor reallocation.
The rapid rise of the private sector (which is far less unionized than the public sector
and much less subject to regulations in terms of wage setting) has also resulted in
greater labor market “flexibility” in many dimensions. Very generous pensions led
massive numbers of older workers to take early retirement during the early phase of
the transition.10
The socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were long
committed, at least nominally, to gender equality in the labor market (Brainerd 2000).
Government policies such as relatively high minimum wages and generous maternity
leave and day care benefits encouraged women to work, and female labor force
participation rates were high compared with those of other countries. Though women
remained over-represented in areas such as health and education, they fared at least as
well as their counterparts in most developed and developing countries in terms of
female–male wage differentials.
10 This statement is true at least for Poland.
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In centrally planned economies, wages were assigned according to occupational
wage scale within each industry. Enterprises operating without competitive pressure
had little control over wage rates and wage differentials. There was no unemployment
in the sense of joblessness, however work efficiency was very low and many job
positions were completely useless. Women were accorded a wide range of rights and
privileges at work, such as fully paid maternity leave, legal protection from overly
physical and dangerous work during pregnancy, and easy access to nursery schools
and health care facilities that were located in larger enterprises.
In terms of occupations and industry branch, women and men were segregated in a
similar way as in the West. It is worth mentioning that in many centrally planned
economies, women’s labor market participation rates were higher than in Western
states. The main reason was the low labor market wages per employee which was not
enough to maintain a basic living standard, forcing both adults in a nuclear family to
work. Relatively few women held senior positions since women undertook a very
large share of domestic duties, thus incurring a double burden and leaving them less
time to pursue a career than men. Also, the revolution in gender relations in the West,
which has brought about a slow but fundamental shift in the household division of
labor, did not happen in communist countries.
The liberalization of the wage setting system, prices, and trade during the transi-
tion toward a market economy has changed this picture dramatically. Enterprises have
gained some control over wages on the one hand, and have faced rising competition
on the other. These peculiar changes in labor market institutions and competitive
environments challenge the existing theory of discrimination (Grajek 2001). One
might expect gradual driving out of discrimination according to Becker’s (1957)
classical model and the “overcrowding” model of Bergmann (1974). On the other
hand, discrimination should survive or even strengthen according to “statistical
discrimination” models (e.g., Aigner and Cain 1977).
According to UNICEF data (1999), female labor market participation has been
falling in many transitional economies since 1989. The scale of the collapse in partic-
ipation rates during the transition period was very large. For example, in Poland, about
one and a half million female jobs disappeared between 1989 and 1994 (Newell and
Barry 2001).
The welfare of both men and women crucially depends on the rate at which the
transitional economies recover and develop. Labor market earnings remain a key
important component of household income in all the transitional economies and
provide a direct link between household welfare and economic activity. As a result
of economic and political transformation in European post-communist states,11
analyses that are conducted for Europe are usually provided separately for transitional
and developed economies. Differences in the situation of women in Eastern and
Western Europe with respect to motivation for entering the labor market were
diametrically opposed. The situation in post-communist countries has been discussed
11 Post-communist countries are also identified as Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), however such
analyses also cover countries that were former Soviet Union Republics which are located in Central Asia.
The reforms in other former Soviet Union Republics have not been profound enough and they are treated as
a different class of countries that are usually identified with The Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) with the exception of Baltic states (Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia) that transformed their economic
and political systems toward the market-oriented economies and became members of European Union.
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by Klasen (1994), Newell and Barry (2001), Keane and Prasad (2006), Lehmann and
Wadsworth (2001), among others. Plasman and Sissoko (2004), Arumpalam et al.
(2004), Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2005), and Daly et al. (2006) have focused
on the situation in well-developed states.
Results of Recent Studies
The profound discussion about the research provided on gender earning gaps is
presented in Ñopo et al. (2011). Published investigations on gender discrimination
and wage discrepancy have shown that generally,
& there is no relationship between economic growth and the narrowing of earnings
gaps for women (Hertz et al. 2008; Blau and Kahn 2001; Tzannatos 1999);
& other reasons that have been found to be linked to gender earnings disparities are:
sectorial segregation to lower wage sectors against women (Tzannatos 1999),
lower female net supply and wage structure (Blau and Kahn 2001), labor market
liberalization, and institutional framework in each country (Weichselbaumer et al.
2007; Blau and Kahn 2001; Cornish 2007 and Tzannatos 1999), among others.
Christofides et al. (2010) discussed the empirical results of the gender wage gap
analysis for a set of 24 EU member states, applying different methods of analysis such as
quantile regression and probit models (Oaxaca and Ransom 1994), decomposition
(Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008), selection procedures, among others. They did so by
using characteristics such as education, firm size, marital status, industry of employment,
age or experience, number of children, income from property rents, financial assets and
other allowances, mortgage expenses, child-care provisions, and occupation. Employing
Oaxaca and Ransom decomposition, the total wage gap was divided into the explained
portion that measures the part of the predicted average wage difference that can be
explained by the difference between the male and female characteristics, and the
unexplained part that corresponds to the male advantage and female disadvantage. The
unexplained part of the gender pay gap is identified as gender earnings discrimination,
since the explained part describes differences in wages caused by such factors as
education, firm size, marital status, industry of employment occupation, experience,
etc. The authors show that a large part of the wage gap is not explained by employing
these features. They also conclude that in several countries the unexplained gap is larger
than the total, suggesting that female characteristics are superior to male ones (for
instance, women are better educated than men). When decomposition is performed
across the wage distribution (using quantile regression), the unexplained gender wage
gap widens at the top of the distribution (the so-called glass ceiling effect) in the majority
of countries and, in some cases, it also widens at the bottom of the distribution (the so-
called sticky floor effect). Thewage gap is wider when non-random selection into work is
taken into account; this suggests that women in the selected samples are more highly
qualified than in the population at large. There is some evidence that countries with more
generous work-family reconciliation policies tend to have stronger glass ceiling and
sticky floor effects.
Matuszewska-Janica and Witkowska (2010 and 2011) investigated relations
among the gender structure of employment and the gender pay gap in different age
Gender Disparities 341
classes and economic branches for 27 European Union member states applying data
from SES 2006. The results of the Pearson linear correlation coefficient evaluation
and verification of statistical significance point out negative and significant correla-
tion between the female employment rate RW (6) and gender pay gap GPG (3) for
total employment and for employees ages 30–39 years.12 They also show that the
structure of employment in 10 post-communist countries (NM10) significantly differs
from the one observed in EU15, i.e., old EU states for total employment and in the
age groups of employees who are from 30 to 59 years old. The gender pay gap is
significantly smaller in NM10 in groups of employees less than 40 years old and
bigger for the group of oldest workers that might be the effect of female early
retirements in the beginning of the transformation period.13
For Western European states, some literature shows that wage differentials are
mainly explained by female segregation into low-wage jobs (Daly et al. 2006), but the
existence of significant inter-industry wage differentials14 in all countries for both
sexes has also been documented (Gannon et al. 2007). There are also studies that
support the idea that gender pay gaps are typically bigger at the top of the wage
distribution and that the gender pay gap differs significantly across the public and
private sector wage distribution of each country (Arumpalam et al. 2004).
With respect to the European and Central Asian economies in transition, authors
agree on the relative improvement of female wages in most countries of the region.
The results indicate a consistent increase in female relative wages across Eastern
Europe, and a substantial decline in female relative wages in Russia and the Ukraine.
Increased wage inequality in Eastern Europe has also depressed female relative
wages, but these losses have been more than offset by gains in rewards based on
observed skills and by an apparent decline in discrimination against women (Brainerd
2000). Still, female segregation into low-wage occupations emerges as the main
contributor to the gender pay gap (Simón 2007). State-owned enterprise wages are
higher than those in the private sector. Further, while wages of men and women are at
parity in the public administration sector, there is a large gender wage-gap in the
private sector in favor of men (Tansel 2004). In general, the pay gap between men and
women in transitional countries is low by international standards, although there is
documented evidence of larger gaps in the higher paid jobs relative to the lower paid
jobs (Newell and Barry 2001). However, Klasen (1994) warns, “…women may be the
biggest losers of the monumental economic changes taking place in the former
communist block. In particular, they may lose much of the economic and social
independence they achieved as a result of their high involvement in the labor
market.”
On the basis of observations made in East Germany during the first years of
transition, Hunt (1998) noticed that four-fifths of the women’s wage rise was attrib-
utable to a selection effect caused by the withdrawal from employment of poorly
qualified women. Hunt’s findings for former East Germany seem to be atypical, since
12 For employees in the age group 40–59, rejection of the null hypothesis is possible only for the
significance level α=0.1 and there is no correlation for the youngest and oldest employees.
13 The policy of early retirements was introduced in Poland (and probably other countries) to decrease high
unemployment that appeared in the first years of transition.
14 Plasman et al. (2006); Gannon et al. (2007), Du Caju et al. (2011) have documented inter-industry wage
differences.
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the departure from the German labor market of poorly qualified women is facilitated
by the existence of a much more generous social safety net in Germany than is
currently in existence in other transitional countries.
Considering economic and political transformation in Poland, Grajek (2001)
claimed that the year that the communists left power (1989) turned out to be far
more important in terms of improving the relative position of women than the actual
year of launching the reform package (1990) and all the following transition years.
Females gained substantially due to the structural shift in the very first years of the
new economic system. The improvements slowed down or even reversed in the
following years, probably due to statistical discrimination.
Adamchik and Bedi (2003) examined gender differences in a variety of labor
market outcomes with an emphasis on the gender wage gap in Poland during 1993–
1997. During this period, the empirical analysis shows there was a marked decline in
relative employment outcomes for women while industrial and occupational segre-
gation remained unchanged. The mean gender wage gap of about 22–23 % remained
steady and, except for a reduction at the lower tail, remained stable throughout the
wage distribution.
Wage gap decompositions show that between 50 and 60 % of the wage differential
in Poland could be explained by differences in observed characteristics. Most of these
differences were attributed to the industrial and occupational affiliation of women.
Although the effect of industrial and occupational segregation on wages forms part of
the so-called explained portion of the wage gap, it may also be viewed as a
consequence of pre- and post-labor market discrimination based on gender
stereotyping. Throughout the period, a large portion of the wage gap remains
unexplained.
The stability of the gender wage gap in Poland suggests that the factors responsible
for determining wage gaps between men and women and the labor market status of
women in general have not changed. The perception of women belonging to certain
educational, occupational, and industrial streams persists. This perception is echoed
and supported by labor legislation that prevents women from working in occupations
and sectors that are considered inimical to their health. The view that women are
primarily responsible for child care and that this responsibility lowers their job
performance also appears to persist. Thus, it seems that stereotypes about women
are very deeply ingrained and have not been influenced by the systemic changes in
the political and economic system in Poland.
Keane and Prasad (2006) examined the evolution of the structure of labor earnings
in Poland over the period 1985–1996 using micro data from the Polish Household
Budget Surveys. The relatively long span of the dataset allowed them to track
changes for an extended period leading up to and following the “big bang”. They
found that overall earnings inequality rose markedly during the transition period of
1989–1996. Keane and Prasad also conducted a detailed examination of the sources
of the increase in earnings inequality. Prior to the transition, the wage structure in
Poland was highly compacted, with wages of college-educated white-collar workers
very similar to those of manual workers. A common view is that the rise of the private
sector, in which there is competitive wage setting and, hence, a more unequal wage
distribution, is the main source of increasing earnings inequality during transition.
Yet, the results obtained by the authors contradict this view.
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In Poland, earnings inequality is indeed higher in the private sector (e.g., the log 90–
10 earnings differential in 1996 was 1.19 in the private sector and 1.05 in the public
sector), and the private sector share of (non-agricultural) employment increased from
5 % in 1988 to 39 % in 1996. Still, Keane and Prasad found that reallocation of labor
from the public to the private sector accounted for only 39 % of the total increase in
earnings inequality (as measured by the change in the variance of log earnings).
The majority of the increase in earnings inequality during the Polish transition (52 %)
was due to increased wage variance within both the public and private sectors. That is,
earnings inequality within both the private and public sectors grew substantially, and by
similar amounts. This is consistent with the view that even state-owned enterprises in
Poland have engaged in substantial restructuring, as suggested by Pinto et al. (1993).
Consistent with their finding of increased earnings inequality within the public sector,
Commander and Dhar (1998) reported a substantial increase in the heterogeneity of
wages across SOEs between 1990 and 1994, with those that performed better in terms of
sales offering higher wages. Keane and Prasad also found that educational wage
premiums increased substantially. Nevertheless, the majority of the increase in overall
earnings inequality (60 %) in Poland is attributable to changes in within-group inequal-
ity. A striking result is that increases in within-group inequality were concentrated
among workers with higher levels of formal education. This is quite different from the
patterns documented for the U.S. and the UK of sharp increases over the last two
decades in between-group inequality at all levels of education (Keane and Prasad 2006).
Newell and Socha (2007) have demonstrated that the private sector in Poland tends to
pay more unequally than the state sector, and since there was a surge of privatization
during 1998–2002, this contributed to the rise in wage inequality. It is also true that
inequality, in the form of hourly wage variance and regression wage premiums to
education and occupation, is consistently higher and in the case of education premiums
rose more quickly in the private sector data. Witkowska (2012) analyzed factors
influencing monthly earnings obtained by men and women in 2005 and 2009, applying
exponential and multinomial logit models that were estimated on the basis of Polish
Labour Force Survey. She found a gender wage gap in both years. The main difference
between the situations observed in 2005 and 2009 was that individuals working for
private enterprises rated their wages lower than employees from public institutions in
2005, while in 2009 the situation was the opposite. Regardless of year of investigation,
womenworking in private institutions were better paid thanwomen in public institutions,
although this variable was significant in 2009 only. In 2005, men working for public
institutions earned more than the ones working for private firms. Employees from the
biggest cities earned significantly more than the ones from the countryside. Respondents
living in towns up to ten thousand inhabitants declared lower wages than employees from
villages in 2009. For 2005, the parameter representing this variable was statistically
insignificant.
Results of Empirical Analysis
There are many factors influencing wages that are either connected with the
individual attributes of employees or describe the general situation in the labor
market and characterize the particular place (institution) of employment. The
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former may be the subject of potential wage disparities. An analysis of factors
affecting gender wage inequality is provided applying regression models that are
estimated on the basis of two data sets.15 The first one contains metadata from
the Structure of Earnings Survey for 2006, i.e., the last available data. The
statistics of the SES (carried out every four years) refer to enterprises operating
in the EU with at least 10 employees in areas of economic activity defined by
sections C-O (2006) of NACE Rev.1.1.(see Table 2). The second set consists of
micro data from the Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS) Q1 2009. PLFS is part
of the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), a large household
sample survey providing quarterly results on labor participation for people aged
15 and over as well as persons outside the labor force.
It is worth mentioning that LFS is a survey of individuals while SES is a
survey of enterprises. Both surveys contain information about labor and earnings,
however the focus of the research differs. In other words, SES and EU LFS
contain data that differ from the point of view of the analyzed period, source of
information, and therefore the information itself. For instance, information about
wages and working hours in SES is given by the enterprise. In the LFS, it comes
from the respondent who declares both income and working time. Information
about payments appears more reliable in SES than EU LFS, but in SES there is
no information about individuals working in small enterprises (i.e., less than 10
employees) and non-active persons or employee family situation, factors also
important in gender disparity analyses.
The constructed models describe either disparities between hourly wages (in the
EU) obtained by men and women or monthly wages (in Poland). Explanatory
variables were selected based on a literature review and data availability.
Models Estimated on the Basis of SES Data
In our research, we estimate several models describing disparities GPDijk between
hourly wages obtained by men and women in European Union member states. We use
two measures describing the wage gap in the i-th state, the j-th economic branch, and
the k-th job seniority group: gender pay gap GPGijk and gender pay convergence
GPCijk coefficient:





15 Eurostat collected data from the 27 Member States of the European Union, three candidate countries and
three countries of the European Free Trade Association. The research was conducted by national statistical
institutes across Europe and centrally processed by Eurostat: using the same concepts and definitions,
following International Labour Organisation guidelines, using common classifications (NACE (in French:
Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne)–Statistical Classi-
fication of Economic Activities in the European Community, ISCO-International Standard Classification of
Occupations, ISCED International Standard Classification of Education, NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Statistics), recording the same set of characteristics in each country.
Gender Disparities 345
GPCijk ¼ GHW FijkGHWMijk ¼ 1−GPGijk ð10Þ
where: GHWMijk and GHWFijk represent average gross hourly earnings of male and
female paid employees, respectively, while i, j, k are defined as above.
Table 3 Levels of education ISCED 1997
Level Description
ISCED1 Primary education
ISCED2 Lower secondary education
ISCED3 Upper secondary education corresponds
to the final stage of secondary
ISCED4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education
ISCED5A Tertiary-type A programs are largely theory-based and are designed to provide
sufficient qualifications for entry to advanced research programmes and profes
sions with high skill requirements, such as medicine, dentistry or architecture.
ISCED5B Tertiary-type B programs are typically shorter than those of tertiary-type A and
focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labor
market, although some theoretical foundations may be covered in the respective programs.
ISCED6 Advanced Research Qualifications refer to tertiary programs that lead directly to
the award of an advanced research qualification, e.g., Ph.D.
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx
Table 2 Classification of economic activities in the European Community: NACE 1.1
Code Description
C Mining and quarrying
D Manufacturing
E Electricity, gas and water supply
F Construction
G Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal and household goods
H Hotels and restaurants
I Transport, storage and communication
J Financial intermediation
K Real estate, renting and business activities
L Public administration and defence, compulsory social
security
M Education
N Health and social work






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For econometric analysis, we select following variables:
1. The activity rate (4) evaluated for women, i.e.:
RAFi ¼ NAFiNW Fi ð11Þ
where for the i-th country: NAFi and NWFi represent counts of active women and
of the whole female population ages 15–64, respectively.
2. Feminization (FEMijk) or masculinization (LMASijk) rates measure employment
structure are defined as follows:




LMASijk ¼ lnNMijk−lnN Fijk
ln NMijk þ N Fijk
  ð13Þ
where: NMijk, NFijk and NWijk represent counts of employed men and women,
and all employees, for the i-th country, the j-th economic sector and the k-th job
seniority group, respectively.
3. Economic branch wage proportion (WAGij) provides information regarding the
structure of hourly earnings in the j-th NACE branches in every country:
WAGij ¼ GHWijGHWi ð14Þ
where GHWij and GHWi represent average gross hourly earnings in the j-th
NACE branch and the whole national economy, respectively.
4. Branch (SEC_code) is described by binary variables defined for NACE codes: D,
E, F, G, H, I, J, K, M, N, O, while SEC_C is the referent (see Table 2).
5. Job seniority group (JOByear1_year2) is described by binary variables
distinguishing for six intervals of length of service (in the enterprise) beginning
from one to five years of service, ending on the interval constructed for those
individuals who worked 30 years and more (JOB30_more). The referent variable
reflects employees working less than one year (JOB0_1).
6. Country dummy (NM12) distinguishes old from new EU member states,
NM12=1 for new EU members and NM12=0 for old EU15 countries.
7. Education of employees (ISCED_code) is considered binary, defined for five
levels of education (see Table 3) from lower secondary education (ISCED_2) to
advanced research qualifications (ISCED_6). The referent variable is primary
education (ISCED_1).
Among estimated16 models, we select only the three that seem to best explain
gender disparities in the European Union (Table 4). The first one (denoted as Model
1) describes GPC (10) in different economic branches. From the model analysis, we
can see that increasing the number of women active in the labor market decreases the
16 Models are estimated applying GLS with heteroscedasticity correction (GRETL). Presented versions of
the models contain only statistically significant variables.
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gender wage convergence. Also, increasing the feminization rate and wage propor-
tions in the j-th branch negatively influences GPC. In other words, the gender pay gap
is bigger in those economic sectors with higher feminization rates and where wages
are bigger than average. The difference in earnings obtained by employees with
tertiary and higher education is greater than the one observed for individuals with
primary education (women earn less than men). In all NACE branches but construc-
tion (SEC_D) and manufactoring (SEC_F) gender disparities are smaller than in
mining and quarrying (SEC_C). It is also visible that in new EU member states the
earning disparity is significantly smaller than for the old ones.
Models, denoted as 2 and 3 (in Table 4), are used to explain gender wage
inqualities that are observed for different economic branches and job seniority
groups. Both models are pretty similar in specification but they differ by
dependent variable (that is either GPG or GPC) and function (linear17 or
exponental). One may notice that the wage proportion (WAG) does not influence
pay differentials significantly, while the activity rate among women and femini-
zation (masculinization) rates are significant variables. For all intervals describing
length of service, the difference in earnings is bigger than the one observed for
individuals who work less than 1 year. Analysing different NACE branches,18
we notice that branches with insignificant (in comparison to mining and quarry-
ing, SEC_C) discrepancies in wages include construction (SEC_D), wholesale and
retail trade (SEC_G), financial intermediation (SEC_J) and real estate, renting,
and business activities (SEC_K).
Models Estimated on the Basis of LFS Data
In regression models constructed for gender disparity measures (Table 4), a
large part of the earnings gap is not explained by selected factors. Therefore we
construct and estimate exponential models describing wages in Poland for all
employees, as well as for men and women separately. Explanatory variables,
that are selected arbitrarily for model construction are often used in research
concerning wages, for instance Newell and Socha (2007). These variables
describe respondent characteristics and employee firm characteristics. The se-
lected factors that describe respondent attributes are:
1. Relationship with the head of the household (REL) dummy variable equals one
for the household head.
2. Place of residence (RES) defined by five classes described by the number in
thousands of inhabitants: cities with more than 100, cities with 50–100, 10–50,
towns with 10 or less, using countryside as the referent category.
3. Marital status (MAR) is a dummy variable equalling one if the respondent is
married.
4. Occupation (OCU) is described as army, managerial, professional, technical,
clerical, sales & services, farmers & fishers, etc., industry workers, skilled
workers, and unskilled workers as the referent category.
17 Statistical test did not reject the hypothesis about the linear form of the model.
18 Data for the NACE branch L are not available.
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5. Education (EDU) is described as university, post-secondary or vocational, general
secondary, lower vocational, and preliminary or lower as the referent category.
6. Gender (GEN) is a dummy variable equalling one for female.
7. Age (AGE)–measured quantitatively
Table 5 Parameter estimates for the model describing logarithm of monthly wages
Explanatory variable Total: N=7132 Women: N=3400 Men: N=3732
Parameter Error Parameter Error Parameter Error
SEC agriculture 4.740 0.070 *** 3.478 0.112 *** 6.080 0.096 ***
industry 4.759 0.063 *** 3.584 0.087 *** 6.080 0.090 ***
service 4.725 0.062 *** 3.547 0.084 *** 6.044 0.089 ***
OWN private 0.051 0.013 *** 0.093 0.019 *** 0.003 0.017
RES >100 thousands 0.080 0.013 *** 0.084 0.019 *** 0.071 0.017 ***
50–100 thousands 0.024 0.019 0.017 0.026 0.030 0.025
10–50 thousands 0.012 0.013 0.036 0.020 * −0.016 0.017
<10 thousands −0.033 0.020 * −0.011 0.028 −0.060 0.026 **
REL household head 0.077 0.011 *** 0.068 0.017 *** 0.087 0.015 ***
GEN woman −0.242 0.012 *** X X X X X X
AGE age 0.101 0.003 *** 0.141 0.004 *** 0.043 0.004 ***
age2 −0.001 0.000 *** −0.002 0.000 *** −0.001 0.000 ***
MAR married 0.004 0.012 −0.047 0.017 *** 0.112 0.017 ***
EDU ISCED_5_6 0.457 0.025 *** 0.570 0.039 *** 0.354 0.034 ***
ISCED_4 0.291 0.020 *** 0.366 0.034 *** 0.222 0.024 ***
ISCED_3 0.317 0.025 *** 0.412 0.038 *** 0.231 0.033 ***
ISCED_2 0.170 0.019 *** 0.235 0.033 *** 0.128 0.022 ***
SIZ <10 employees −0.079 0.018 *** −0.080 0.026 *** −0.135 0.023 ***
11–19 employees −0.026 0.018 0.021 0.027 −0.105 0.024 ***
20–49 employees 0.020 0.016 0.035 0.024 −0.024 0.021
>100 employees 0.110 0.015 *** 0.119 0.022 *** 0.085 0.019 ***
OCU army 0.575 0.056 *** 0.894 0.410 ** 0.500 0.057 ***
managerial 0.610 0.033 *** 0.611 0.049 *** 0.567 0.042 ***
professional 0.381 0.025 *** 0.382 0.032 *** 0.346 0.042 ***
technical 0.332 0.023 *** 0.341 0.031 *** 0.297 0.033 ***
clerical 0.199 0.023 *** 0.256 0.031 *** 0.085 0.035 **
sales & services 0.136 0.022 *** 0.178 0.029 *** 0.057 0.034 *
farmers, fishers, etc. 0.184 0.067 *** 0.380 0.174 ** 0.099 0.068
industry workers 0.185 0.019 *** 0.094 0.035 *** 0.161 0.024 ***
skilled workers 0.234 0.020 *** 0.196 0.039 *** 0.201 0.025 ***
R2 adj. 0.9970 R2 adj. 0.997 R2 adj. 0.332
Witkowska and Majka (2012)
*Denotes significance level α=0.1, **α=0.05, and ***α=0.01; X–denotes lack of variables
350 D. Witkowska
To characterize employee firms or institutions, we apply the following variables:
1. Type of the enterprise ownership (OWN) is a dummy variable equalling one for
private and zero for public employers.
2. Size of employee’s institution or firm (SIZ) is described as enterprises employing
less than 10, 11 to 19, 20 to 49, 50–100, and more than 100 employees.
Enterprises employing 50 to 100 employees is the referent category.
3. Economic sector (SEC) is described selectively as: agriculture, industry, and
service, with other branches as the referent category.
Among the selected factors, only type of ownership does not influence wages in
Poland (Table 5). The models show that women in Poland earn 21.5 % less than men if
monthly wages are considered. This may be caused either by the gender wage gap or by
fewer working hours during a month. Heads of households earn more than others in the
household.Married women earn less than unmarried ones, while married men earnmore
than the referent group. Respondents living in cities with over ten thousand inhabitants
earn more than those living in the countryside, however the latter have higher monthly
incomes than individuals living in cities with less than ten thousand inhabitants. The last
statement is true for the total sample and the model constructed for men. Education
positively influences wages and better education results in higher incomes. The highest
monthly salaries are obtained by employees from the biggest enterprises (institutions).
All occupational types generate higher salaries than those of unskilled workers, but for
men, sales & services and farmers & fishers are insignificant.
Conclusions
The position of men and women still differs essentially throughout Europe and the
situation of women has not improved quickly, regardless of the monitoring of gender
equality by specially founded European institutions and their effectiveness. Gender
disparities is a multidimensional problem which is relatively easy to discuss but difficult
to describe and extremely difficult to overcome since the majority of the factors
influencing gender inequalities are not measurable or even directly observable.
There are considerable differences inside the EuropeanUnion that are connected with
history, tradition, culture, and the welfare of EUmember states. The European landscape
with regard to gender equality has also changed because of recent enlargements. Most of
the new EU member states have a quite distinct history of work and family policy and
essential changes, not only in the political or economic arenas but also in the social
sphere that have taken place during the last 20 years of economic transformation.
In the paper we discuss several aspects of gender disparities based on literature
reviews and our own investigation. Our results confirm previous analyses that wage
discrimination varies for different groups of employees and depends on the branch,
age group, education, country, feminization of economic sectors, and activity of
women in the labor market.
The gender pay gap is wider among employees earning higher wages since such
relations are visible for higher job seniority groups and for better educated people
who usually earn more than individuals from the referent groups. The increase in
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women’s activity (RAF) and feminization (FEM) rates cause higher wage distortion. The
labor market situation in Poland, a transitional economy, seems quite similar to the
situation in other EuropeanUnionmember states in terms of factors that influence wages.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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